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Wesser: Environmental Law

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
OREGON NATURAL RESOURCES COUNCIL
v. MARSH: THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ESTABLISHES A POTENT STANDARD FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE
I. INTRODUCTION
In Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh,! the Ninth
Circuit held that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' (Corps) Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) relating to construction of
the proposed Elk Creek Dam failed to satisfy the requirements
of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).2 In reversing
the denial of injunctive relief, the court agreed with plaintiffs'
contentions that the EIS was insufficient due to the Corps' failure to specify and analyze techniques mitigating the adverse environmental impacts of the project. s Further, the court held that
the Corps must (1) prepare a new supplemental EIS addressing
new information obtained regarding the environmental impact
of the project,' (2) prepare a worst case analysis or conduct further research on the issue of waterflow from Elk Creek,c> and (3)
address the cumulative impact of Elk Creek Dam in conjunction
with two other nearby existing dams. 6
1. 820 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1987) (per Ferguson, J.; the other panel members were
Norris, J., and Wallace, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982).
3. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1987).
Plaintiffs are Oregon Natural Resources Council, Oregon Guides and Packers Assn., Inc.,
Rogue Flyfishers, Inc., and Rogue River Guides Assn., nonprofit groups claiming injury
by the dam's construction. [d. at 1054 n.2.
4. [d. at 1058.
5. [d. at 1059.
6. [d. at 1060. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings regarding the
placement of opposing views in the EIS, the Corps' discussion of conflicts between the
proposed Elk Creek Dam and competing federal policies, and the adequacy of the cost-
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II. FACTS
The Rogue River, into which Elk Creek flows, is located in
southwestern Oregon. The Rogue is one of eight rivers designated as "wild and scenic" by the U.S. Congress,7 and its fishing
and white water recreation are of national repute. s In 1962, Congress authorized construction of Elk Creek Dam, Applegate
River Dam, and Lost Creek Dam to control flooding in the
Rogue River Basin. 9 The Applegate River and Lost Creek dams
have since been completed. 1o

In 1971, the Corps completed the final EIS on the Elk Creek
project. l l In 1975, the Corps drafted a supplemental EIS after
studying the projected impact of the dam on turbidityl2 in the
Rogue River.ls In 1980, after completing additional turbidity
and temperature projections, the Corps filed a revised draft supplemental EIS.14 These analyses generated much criticism by
state and federal agencies. lII The Corps placed these comments
and its responses to them in a separate section of its final supplemental EIS.16
In August, 1985, although funding was not sought by the
Corps,17 Congress appropriated funds and directed the Corps to
benefit analysis employed. Id. at 1060-6!.
7. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1053-54 (citing Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C_ § 1271
(1982».
8. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1054.
9.Id.
10.Id.
11. Id. The Elk Creek project, as proposed, includes a concrete dam 249 feet high
and 2,580 feet long. Id. The reservoir created will cover approximately 1,290 acres of
land.ld.
12. Id. "Turbidity" is defined by the Corps as "an expression of the optical property
of water which causes light to be scattered and absorbed rather than transmitted
through in straight lines ... [which) is caused by suspended matter." Id. at 1054 n.!.
"Simply stated, turbidity is murkiness due to stirred-up sediment." Id.
13. Id. at 1054. During this period, the Governor of Oregon withdrew state support
for the project and requested that work be suspended until its effect on water quality in
the Rogue could be evaluated. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 628 F. Supp.
1557, 1561 (D. Or. 1986), rev'd, 820 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1987).
14. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1054. Projections were based on observations at Lost Creek
Dam in 1977 and simulated models. Id.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 97-102.
16. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1054.
17. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 628 F. Supp. 1557, 1561 (D. Or.
1986), rev'd, 820 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1987). Despite the Corps' issuance of a Record of
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begin construction of Elk Creek Dam. Is Shortly thereafter,
plaintiffs brought this action in federal district court to enjoin
construction of the project. I9 The district court held that the
Corps' preparation of the EIS satisfied NEP A requirements and
denied plaintiff's request for injunctive relief. 20
III. BACKGROUND
In introducing the National Environmental Policy Act, Congress broadly declared its intent to encourage harmony with, and
prevent damage to the environment.21 NEPA directs all federal
agencies to consider environmental issues "to the fullest extent
possible," during the planning and implementation of proposed
actions. 22 NEPA also established the Council of Environmental
Quality (CEQ),23 which issues regulations implementing NEPA's
procedural requirements. 24
Decision, water quality data, an Environmental Assessment, and Finding of No Significant Impact (all in support of proceeding with the project), the Corps did not seek Congressional funding. Id. Plaintiffs assert that the Corps' uncharacteristic failure to seek
funding was caused by its prior opposition to the Elk Creek project. Oregon Natural
Resources Council, White Paper 7-8 (August 23, 1987).
18. Marsh, 628 F. Supp. at 1561.
19.Id.
20. Id. at 1568-69. The court concluded that the Corps satisfied its obligations under
NEPA since it took a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of the proposed
dam.ld.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982). Congress further described its intent "[t]o declare a
national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man
and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the
environment ... [and] to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural
resources important to the Nation ...." Id. Congress enumerated several intended goals
such as the recognition of the populace as trustee of the environment for future generations, and the preservation of important historic, cultural and natural resources. 42
U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1982). For a discussion of the legislative history and intent of NEPA,
see W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 7.1 (1977) [hereinafter W. RODGERS], and Murchison, Does NEPA Matter? -An Analysis of the Historical Development
and Contemporary Significance of the National Environmental Policy Act, 18 U. RICH.
L. REV. 557 (1984) [hereinafter MURCHISON].
22. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). NEPA's requirements are subordinate to an
agency's conflicting obligations arising under other statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 4334 (1982). See
also MURCHISON, supra note 21, at 559.
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-47 (1982).
24. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-08 (1986). See generally MURCHISON, supra note 20, at 589.
The CEQ's initial advisory role was enhanced by President Carter's executive order authori2ing CEQ's promulgation of environmental guidelines binding on federal agencies.
Id. CEQ regulations are binding on federal agencies and entitled to substantial deference
by the courts. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979).
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The key provision enacted to attain Congress' environmental objectives requires federal agencies to include an EIS with
every proposal for major federal actions significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment. 25 The primary purposes
of an EIS are to foster both informed decision-making and informed public participation in light of the environmental consequences of a proposed project.26 An agency's obligations under
NEPA are generally considered to be satisfied upon the preparation and circulation of an EIS which demonstrates that a project's environmental impact has been fully evaluated.27
25. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). See F. SKILLERN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION-THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK § 2.21 (1981 & Supp. 1987) [hereinafter F. SKILLERN] (the
role of the EIS in the decisionmaking process is to assure the protection of the public
interest); see also D. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW & LITIGATION, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT § 1:01 (1984 & Supp. 1987) [hereinafter D. MANDELKER].
An Environmental Impact Statement is defined as a detailed statement of the responsible official on:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of longterm productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable committments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should
it be implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982).
26. Citizens for a Better Henderson v. Hodel, 768 F.2d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 1985).
Better Henderson upheld an EIS for construction of power transmission lines within city
limits. Id. at 1057. See also 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (1986) (CEQ's view of the purpose of an
EIS).
27. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), which severely limited the scope of judicial review of agency
decisions under NEPA. Reversing a decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, the Supreme Court held that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's failure to
address energy conservation as an alternative to the construction of a nuclear power
plant did not invalidate its EIS. Id. at 552-53. "NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural." Id.
at 558 (emphasis added). See also Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)
(in reviewing agency action, the court's only role is to insure that the agency has taken a
"hard look" at the environmental consequences). See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text. See generally F. SKILLERN, supra note 25, at 21 (favorable view of NEPA's
significance). But cf. MURCHISON, supra note 21, at 603 (articulating a skeptical view of
NEPA's significance for environmental protection).
CEQ's view of NEPA's purpose states: "NEPA procedures must insure that environmental information is available to public officials and citizens before decisions are made
and before actions are taken. The information must be of high quality. Accurate scientific analysis, expert agency comments, and public scrutiny are essential to implementing
NEPA." 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (1986).
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing the sufficiency of an EIS under NEPA, the
Ninth Circuit applies a "rule of reason," the standard generally
recognized in the federal courts.28 For example, in Enos v.
Marsh,29 the court reviewed the sufficiency of the Corps of Engineers' EIS discussion of the secondary environmental effects of
its proposed deep draft harbor project. 30 Applying the "rule of
reason," the court described its task as to determine "whether
an EIS contains a reasonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the probable environmental consequences,"31
thereby fostering informed decision-making and public participation. 32 The court held that the EIS adequately alerted deci28. See Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 1363, 1372 (9th Cir. 1985), discussed infra notes 2934 and accompanying text; Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442, 1460-61 (9th Cir.
1984) ("rule of reason" applied to determine adequacy of transportation department's
EIS), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1108 (1985), discussed infra notes 47-52 and accompanying
text; California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1982) ("rule of reason" applied to
determine adequacy of Forest Service EIS). See generally F. SKILLERN, supra note 25, at
§ 2.39.
The Second Circuit also employs a "rule of reason" in reviewing the sufficiency of
the contents of an EIS. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701
F.2d lOll, 1031 (2nd Cir. 1983). The court applied a "rule of reason" in evaluating the
Corps' EIS for a highway and urban renewal project. Id. By its inclusion of false statements regarding the aquatic impact of the project and omission of impact on fisheries,
the court found that the EIS did not adequately compile relevant information on the
project. Id. In Druid Hills Civic Ass'n v. Federal Highway Admin., 772 F.2d 700 (11th
Cir. 1985), the Eleventh Circuit applied a "rule of reason" to assess the contents of a
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) EIS supporting construction of the Presidential Parkway in Atlanta. Id. at 708-09. Upon review of the plaintiffs' claims disputing the
FHWA's traffic and safety data, the court held that they failed to demonstrate the substantial procedural flaws necessary to invalidate the EIS. Id. at 712.
In Township of Springfield v. Lewis, 702 F.2d 426 (3rd Cir. 1983), the Third Circuit
rejected plaintiffs' challenges of the adequacy of a highway administration EIS for highway construction through a New Jersey park. Id. at 442. Rather than applying a "rule of
reason," the court applied the more deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard by
shifting the focus of the inquiry from adequacy of the EIS's contents to the agency's
substantive decision to go forward with the project. Id. at 441. Based on the district
court's analysis and substantial volume of the EIS, the agency action was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Id. at 442.
29. 769 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1985).
30. Id. at 1371.
31. Id. at 1372 (citing California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1982».
32. Enos, 769 F.2d at 1372. Judicial authority to review agency decisions is pursuant
to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (1982), empowering courts to
set aside agency actions taken without observance of procedures required by law. Id.
This circuitous source of authority is necessary because Congress failed to provide any
enforcement mechanism within NEPA. See MURCHISON, supra note 21, at 562.
While a "rule of reason" is employed in the review of agency decisions, district court
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sion-makers and the public to potential secondary effects of the
project, and that further analysis was not required. 33 The court
reasoned that the EIS's brief references to the harbor project's
impact on population growth, urbanization, and pollution,
though potentially "far reaching," were sufficient, since such
consequences were speculative and dependent on local development decisions. 34
B.

ADEQUACY OF AN

EIS'

MITIGATION PLAN

CEQ requlations require that an EIS include a discussion of
"[m]eans to mitigate adverse environmental impacts .... "35 The
Ninth Circuit requires that an EIS include an analysis and evaluation of measures to be employed to mitigate the adverse ef':
fects of the project.36
In Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association v.
Peterson,37 the Ninth Circuit reviewed a Forest Service plan to
permit timber harvesting and road construction in a portion of
Six Rivers National Forest considered sacred by Indians in the
area. 38 The court held that the EIS's discussion, which neither
analyzed nor explained the effectiveness of mitigation measures
planned, was insufficient to ensure the level of informed decidecisions are reviewed to determine whether they are grounded upon an erroneous legal
standard or upon clearly erroneous findings of fact. Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 740 F.2d
1442, 1460-61 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1108 (1985). See infra notes 47-52
and accompanying text.
33. Enos, 769 F.2d at 1373.
34.Id.
35. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(h) (1986).
36. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581, 588 (9th
Cir. 1985), vacated in part on rehearing on other grounds, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert. granted sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 107 S. Ct.
1971 (1987). Complete compensation for adverse impacts is not required as long as significant mitigation measures are undertaken. Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v.
Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 1985). The Ninth Circuit upheld a U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service decision not to prepare an EIS despite the project's impact on an "endangered species." Id. at 988-89. One factor supporting the court's decision was the enhancement of survival of the Mission Blue Butterfly due to mitigation measures adopted.
Id. at 987.
37. 764 F.2d 581, 588 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated in part on rehearing on other
grounds, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. granted sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. 1971 (1987).
38. Id. at 583.
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sion-making contemplated by NEPA.39
In Trout Unlimited v. Morton,40 the Ninth Circuit considered challenges to the Bureau of Reclamation's ErS for construction of the Teton Dam and reservoir. 41 The court held that the
Bureau's ErS discussion of mitigation measures, organized under
eight headings, was adequate though conceding that it could
have been more extensive.42 The court stated that the Bureau's
issuance of an elaborate mitigation plan for wildlife after filing
of the final ErS "suggested" that the ErS was adequate to inform decision-makers.43

C. DUTY TO SUPPLEMENT ErS
CEQ regulations require that federal agencies supplement
an ErS when significant new information is acquired or new circumstances develop, relevant to the environmental impact of a
proposed action.44 The Ninth Circuit expands on this theme by
finding a continuing duty by federal agencies to gather and evaluate new information relevant to the environmental impact of
its actions after the issuance of its ErS.41S However, reasonable
agency decisions not to supplement an ErS in light of new information will be upheld. 46
39. [d. at 588 (citing Adler v. Lewis, 675 F.2d 1085, 1096 (9th Cir. 1982». See also
Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 351-52 (8th Cir. 1972) (EIS for
river channeli2ation project which did not contain specific mitigation plan nor a discussion of alternative of acquiring land to mitigate loss of natural resources was held inadequate even though this alternative involved a separate project requiring separate Congressional authorization); Prince George's County v. Holloway, 404 F. Supp. 1181, 118687 (D.D.C. 1975) (EIS for relocation of naval oceanographic center which did not consider mitigation measures regarding the impact on housing and education in the affected
community was held inadequate). See generally D. MANDELKER, supra note 25, § 10:17;
and MURCHISON, supra note 21, at 608-09 (CEQ regulations such as mitigation provisions
may provide important basis for environmental challenges, even though they may exceed
scope of NEPA's statutory framework).
40. 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974).
41. [d. at 1281.
42. [d. at 1284.
43. [d.

44. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(ii) (1986).
45. Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442, 1463 (9th Cir. 1984). "When new information comes to light the agency must consider it, evaluate it, and make a reasoned
determination whether it is of such significance as to require implementation of formal
NEPA filing requirements." [d. at 1463-64.
46. [d. at 1463. In Township of Springfield v. Lewis, 702 F.2d 426 (3rd Cir. 1983),
discussed supra note 28, the Third Circuit held that new information dealing with the
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In Stop H-3 Association v. Dole;" the Ninth Circuit identified four factors for determining the reasonableness of an
agency's decision not to supplement its EIS.48 Reasonableness
depends on (1) the environmental significance of the new information, (2) the probable accuracy of the information, (3) the degree of care with which the agency considered and evaluated the
information, and (4) the degree to which the agency supported
its decision not to supplement the EIS.49
In Stop H-3, the court reviewed a transportation department decision not to supplement its EIS for a proposed extension of interstate highway with allegedly new and significant
population data.50 The court concluded that information developed from 1978 Hawaii state population projections did not require supplementation since the changes were not significantly
different from the population ranges discussed in the EIS.51 Furthermore, the court considered that data revealed by the 1980
census was not shown to be so environmentally significant as to
require supplementation even though population growth in the
area to be served by the project exceeded local planning
objectives. 52
In Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble,53 the Ninth
Circuit considered claims that the Corps of Engineers improperly failed to supplement the EIS for the construction of Warm
traffic, noise, and air quality impacts of the project, included in the final EIS after circulation of the draft EIS did not violate NEPA. Id. at 439 (emphasis added). In Wisconsin
v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1984), the Seventh Circuit treated a Navy decision
not to supplement the EIS with new information dealing with the biological effects of its
submarine communications project as a decision not to issue an EIS at all. Id. at 417. By
this approach, the court was able to apply the more deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard to the Navy's action, facilitating its decision that NEPA was not violated. Id. at 424. The court held that a supplementary EIS was not required unless the
new information presented "a seriously different picture of the environmental landscape
such that another hard look is necessary." Id. at 418 (emphasis in original). See generally F. SKILLERN, supra note 25, § 2.48A; D. MANnELKER, supra note 25, §§ 10:43-10:45.
47. 740 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1108 (1985).
48. Id. at 1464.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1463-64.
51. Id at 1464-65.
52. Id. at 1465. Furthermore, the court stated that the transportation agency's concurrence in the EIS was conditioned on recognition of an obligation to cooperate with
local agencies' planning goals. Id.
53. 621 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1980).
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Springs Dam.1I4 The plaintiffs argued that new information became available which suggested that the ErS underestimated the
force of potential earthquake activity in the area. 1I1I The court
concluded that this information was significant because it suggested that the dam, as designed, might not withstand such seismic activity.t16 The court, how~ver, questioned the accuracy of
the newly acquired information, which also failed to supply data
indicating the strength of potential earthquakes. 1I7 The court determined that the Corps' decision not to supplement the ErS in
light of this information was unreasonable at the time. lls However, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Corps' failure was
cured by studies undertaken subsequent to trial which reaffirmed the seismic data presented in the ErS.1I9 On the basis of
this, most recent information, the Corps' decision not to supplement the ErS to address the information at issue in this case
was deemed reasonable.60
D.

REQUIREMENT OF WORST CASE ANALYSIS

CEQ regulations in effect during the planning stages of the
Elk Creek Dam required that when an agency was uncertain or
lacked information as to the adverse environmental effects of its
actions, it must make clear, in the ErS, that such uncertainty
existed.61 If information is lacking that is essential to a reasoned
choice and the cost of obtaining it is not exorbitant, the agency
must obtain the information and include it in the statement or
include a worst case analysis.62
In Sierra Club v. Sigler,63 the Fifth Circuit interpreted the
CEQ's worst case requirement in a case where the Corps proposed the construction of oil pipelines and a tanker superport in
54. Id. at 1023.
55.Id.
56. Id. at 1025.
57. Id. The court considered the new information more significant for the questions
it raised rather than the answers it provided. Id.
58.Id.
59.Id.
60. Id. at 1026.
61. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (subsequently amended April 25, 1986).
62.Id.
63. 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983).
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Galveston Bay.64 The plaintiffs contended that the EIS was inadequate since it did not include a worst case analysis of a catastrophic oil spill.65 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the purpose
of the worst case requirement is to disclose to the decision-makers all known potential environmental consequences of an
agency action. 66 The court held that the EIS must analyze the
probability of such a spill, rejecting the Corps' arguments that
such a scenario was unreasonably speculative. 67
In Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark,68 the Ninth Circuit ,held
that the Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) worst case analysis for its herbicide spraying program was inadequate. 69 The
court noted that the CEQ's worst case requirement was not new,
but rather a codification of prior case law which required analysis of the costs of proceeding with a project absent relevant information. 70 Furthermore, the court reaffirmed the principle that
when a project's environmental consequences are uncertain, disclosure of such uncertainty is insufficient.71 The court held that
an analysis of the spectrum of possible events, including the
worst case situation that cancer could be spread by implementation of its spraying program, was required. 72
E.

CUMULATIVE IMPACT REQUIREMENT

To further NEPA's objectives of promoting informed deci64. [d. at 968-75.
65. [d. at 968.
66. [d. at 973.
67. [d. at 974-75.
68. 747 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1984).
69. [d. at 1245-46.
70. [d. at 1244 (citing Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark,
720 F.2d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028 (1984». See also 40
C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(5) (1986) (requiring a similar analysis when a project's environmental risks are uncertain).
71. Save Our Ecosystems, 747 F.2d at 1244.
72. [d. at 1244-45. The court rejected the BLM's argument that a worst case analysis was not required where the occurrence of such an event was not supported by scientific data. [d. See also Southern Oregon Citizens, 720 F.2d at 1479 (worst case analysis
requirement applied to Bureau of Land Management's proposed insect spraying program
despite bureau's contention that a worst case event was improbable). But see Oregon
EnvtL Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 495-96 (9th Cir. 1987) (agency's use of worst
case analysis in EIS for gypsy moth eradication project upheld despite agency's failure to
explicitly show cost of further study exorbitant). See generally F. SKILLERN, supra note
25, § 2.50A; D. MANDELKER, supra note 25, § 10:17.
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sion-making and public awareness of proposed federal actions,
CEQ regulations require EIS discussion of the cumulative impact of its proposed actions. 73 " 'Cumulative impact' is the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and
reasonably foreseeable future actions ...."74
In Kleppe v. Sierra Club,75 the Supreme Court reviewed a
District of Columbia Circuit decision ordering the federal government to prepare a comprehensive EIS analyzing coal development in the northern Great Plains region of the United States
prior to approving specific development permits.76 In reversing
the circuit court, the Supreme Court held that analysis of the
cumulative impact of regional development under consideration,
was not required, unless such agency action was formally proposed." However, the Court also noted that an agency could approve one project in an area where other projects are contemplated, and then take into consideration the environmental
effects of the existing project when preparing a statement on the
cumulative impact of the remaining proposals.78

In Thomas v. Peterson,79 the Ninth Circuit reviewed challenges to the United States Forest Service's (Service) approval
of timber harvesting and timber road construction in Idaho's national forests. 8o The plaintiffs claimed that the Service violated
NEPA by failing to issue an EIS addressing the cumulative environmental impact of the road construction together with the
planned timber harvest. 81 The court explained that since the
73. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16 (1986) (specifying certain topics to be addressed in an
EIS, including a project's direct and indirect environmental effects).
74. 40 C.F.R.§ 1508.7 (1986).
75. 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
76. [d. at 408.
77. [d. at 414-15.
78. [d. at 414 n.26. See also Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225, 1247 (5th Cir.
1985) (Corps of Engineers' assessment of cumulative impact of proposed housing development on fragile wetlands held inadequate since it failed to address numerous actions
affecting the same area); and Prince George's County v. Holloway, 404 F. Supp. 1181,
1186 (D.D.C. 1975), discussed supra note 39, (EIS prepared for transfer of naval oceanographic program was held inadequate for failure to address cumulative impact of
planned transfer of army and NASA personnel to same location). See generally F. SKILLERN, supra note 25, § 2.35; D. MANDELKER, supra note 25, § 10:37.
79. 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985).
80. [d. at 756.
81. [d. at 757.
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timber sales could not take place without the road construction,
and the roads would not be necessary but for the timber sales,
the projects were "connected actions" for purposes of the CEQ
regulations. 82 The court found that these actions were being
planned contemporaneously and that together, they would significantly impact Salmon River trout and salmon populations as
well as the habitat of the endangered Rocky Mountain Gray
Wolf.83 Due to the interdependency of these actions, and the extent of their combined environmental effects, the Ninth Circuit
held that the Service must prepare an EIS addressing these
issues. 84
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

A.

MAJORITY

Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh involved alleged violations of NEPA and related CEQ regulations regarding
the adequacy of the Corps' final EIS for the proposed Elk Creek
Dam. The court began its analysis by declaring its duty to apply
a standard of reasonableness to agency decisions.85
1.

Adequacy of the Mitigation Plan

The plaintiffs first argued that the mitigation plan for wildlife violated NEPA and CEQ guidelines because the EIS failed
to specifically analyze or evaluate the measures submitted.86 The
court evaluated the Corps' mitigation plan in light of its function to enable informed judgments by decision-makers, and full
disclosure of the environmental impact of a project.87
The court emphasized that by January 1986, the mitigation
plan for wildlife, published in 1980, had not yet been finalized. 88
The plan stated that measures to compensate for loss of wildlife
82. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1) (1986).
83. [d. at 759-60.
84. [d. at 761.
85. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir. 1987).
See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
86. [d. at 1055.
87. [d. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
88. [d.
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habitat would be developed, and would consist of management
of selected lands to improve the quality of wildlife habitat. 89 The
court declared that this failure to complete the mitigation plan
rendered its analysis or evaluation by decision-makers impossible.90 Furthermore, the court considered that the plan's use of
general phrases such as "habitat manipulative techniques," and
"habitat development measures," was inadequate without specification of the techniques contemplated. 91 In addition, the EIS
failed to analyze and evaluate the effectiveness of the measures
presented. 92 Based on these deficiencies, the court agreed with
plaintiffs' contentions and held that the mitigation plan violated
NEPA's requirements.93

2. Duty to Supplement the EIS
The next issue concerned whether the Corps' failure to supplement its EIS after obtaining new information regarding the
project's environmental effects, violated NEPA.94 The Ninth
Circuit reiterated the applicable standard, to uphold such
agency decisions if reasonable,911 and proceeded to apply the
Stop H-3 Association v. Dole four-factor analysis. 9B
Two studies completed subsequent to the Corps' 1980 supplemental EIS presented new information relevant to the environmental impact of the proposed Elk Creek Dam.97 The Oregon
Department of Fish and Wildlife (Department), in its study
completed August 1985, found "that the project could result in
decreased survivability of chinook salmon,98 higher turbidity,99
89. Id. Mitigation measures were to be developed subsequent to studies undertaken
at nearby Applegate River Dam. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. The court also concluded that the Corps' mitigation plan failed to satisfy
CEQ guidelines. Id.
94. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1056.
95. Id. See supra notes 44-60 and accompanying text.
96. Id. (citing Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1108 (1985». Applying the Stop H-3 test, the court recognized that
these factors were neither mandatory nor exclusive. Id. at 1056 n.3, (citing Warm Springs
Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 1024 (9th Cir. 1980».
97. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1056. These studies criticized the Corps' conclusions in several respects. Id. at 1056-57. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
98. Id. at 1056. Based on observations of the impact of nearby Lost Creek Dam,
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increased disease potential in fish,I°O and decreased prospects for
lure- and fl.y~fishing."lOI The United States Soil Conservation
Service study disclosed significant new turbidity information
corroborating the Department study.l02
Conceding that these findings were· not conclusive,103 the
court was convinced that these studies presented legitimate environmental concerns regarding decreased fish survivability and
increased downstream turbidity not previously available; and
was therefore environmentally significant under Stop H_3. 104
Continuing with the Stop H-3 approach, the court applied
the second factor regarding the probable accuracy of the information obtained, and concluded that, at a minimum, some of
this recently acquired information was "probably accurate."lOI)
The court pointed out that although independent experts were
critical of many of the Department's conclusions, there was
.
agreement on significant portions. lOS
In addition, the Corps did not respond to significant concerns presented by the studies such as increased turbidity
caused by project related roadbuilding in the Elk Creek watershed. l07 Accordingly, the court concluded that the Corps failed
to exercise the proper level of care required under the third Stop
Department scientists believed that similar circumstances could result from construction
and operation of Elk Creek Dam. Id. at 1056-57. Increased water temperatures caused by
the release of warmer water could cause decreased survival of chinook salmon. Id.
99. Id. at 1056. Department scientists believed that logging and road building associated with the project would result in higher turbidity. Id. at 1056-57.
100. Id. at 1056. Although chinook salmon mortality rates have decreased to near
zero, Department scientists believe there may be a connection between water flow con.
trols and increased fish disease. Id.
101. Id. at 1056. Higher water flows in the Rogue could decrease fishing prospects.
Id. at 1057. Furthermore, reduction of the Department's budget by the Corps made additional study impossible. Id. at 1057.
102. Id. Soil content in the Elk Creek watershed was found to be different than that
stated in the EIS, having a substantially greater turbidity potential. Id.
103. Id. Department scientists recommended further study of fish survivability and
turbidity before the dam is built. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. Based on a review of the experts' testimony and data, the court believed
that at least some of this information was "probably accurate." Id.
107. Id. at 1057-58. Further, the Corps failed to respond to study conclusions regarding fish mortality due to disease, and to increased erosion potential. Id.
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H -3 factor .IOS

Under the fourth Stop H-3 factor, the court determined
that the Corps neglected to support its decision not to supplement its EIS.l09 In the court's view, since this new information
raised legitimate environmental concerns, the Corps should have
considered the information and at least presented additional
support as to why supplementation was not required. 11o For
these reasons, the majority held that the Corps must prepare a
supplemental EIS to address the environmental impact of this
new information. 11 I

3. Worst Case Requirement
The Ninth Circuit considered plaintiffs' contention that the
Corps failed to satisfy the CEQ's "worst case" regulation. 112
They argued that the EIS revealed uncertainty regarding the
amount of water flow Elk Creek contributed to the Rogue, directly affecting turbidity levels. 113 Therefore, plaintiffs claimed
that NEP A required further study on this issue or a worst case
analysis to indicate the extent that turbidity resulting from Elk
Creek dam would affect the Rogue. 114
The court noted that the Corps, in its supplemental EIS,
acknowledged its uncertainty regarding Elk Creek's contribution
to total water flow in the Rogue. 111l However, the Ninth Circuit
rejected the district court's finding that disclosure of uncertainty
in the EIS satisfied the worst case requirement. 116 The court
held that the Corps must do further research on the question of
108.ld.
109.ld.
110. ld. When the Corps learned that the soil in the Elk Creek watershed contained
sedimentation levels in excess of that reported in the EIS, it chose not to respond. ld. at
1058.
111. ld. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service officials believed that a new supplemental
EIS should be prepared, based on possible decreased water storage needs. ld. at 1058 n.7.
112. ld. at 1058.
113. ld. at 1057-58. Water flow levels also affect fishing prospects. ld. at 1057,1060.
114. ld. at 1058-59. See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
115. ld. The Corps asserted that Elk Creek Dam would have little effect on temperature and turbidity on the Rogue. ld. However, in response to Oregon Department of
Fish and Wildlife criticism, the Corps conceded that Elk Creek could contribute up to
25% of waterflow. ld.
116. ld. at 1059.
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water flow contribution from Elk Creak or prepare a worst case
analysis. 1l7 The majority118 added that the Corps' worst case responsibility also applied to the subsequently acquired information which it must now address. lls

4. Cumulative Impact Requirement
The Ninth Circuit considered plaintiffs' contention that the
Corps unreasonably limited the scope of the EIS by failing to
consider the cumulative effects of the three dam projects comprising the Rogue River Basin Project. 120 Section 1508.7 of the
CEQ guidelines requires the Corps to evaluate the incremental
impact of its project in light of other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable actions. l2l
While the court rejected plaintiffs' contention that a separate EIS was required for the entire project,122 the court was
persuaded that the Corps did not take a "hard look" at the cumulative impact of the three dam project.123 In its final supplemental EIS, the Corps admitted that turbidity in the Rogue
would increase as a result of the entire basin project.124 However, in concluding that fish production would not be significantly affected by this increased turbidity, the Corps considered
only the turbidity created by the Elk Creek Dam project.1211 Furthermore, in response to a United States Environmental Protection Agency comment, the Corps declared that the Elk Creek
EIS was not the proper place to discuss the effects on downstream water quality of Lost Creek Dam.126 The court disagreed
117. ld. (citing Oregon Envtl Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 495 (9th Cir.
1987».
118. Judge Wallace dissented from this portion of the worst case decision. Marsh,
820 F.2d at 1062 (Wallace, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
119. ld. at 1059.
120. ld. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
121. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (1986). See supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
122. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1059. The plaintiffs argued that 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(2)
requires the three dam project be evaluated in a single EIS because they are part of a
connected plan. ld. The court, however, found that the requirement of a single EIS applied only to "proposed actions." ld. Here, the other two dams were already in place. See
supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
123. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1059-60.
124. ld. at 1060.
125.ld.
126. ld.
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with this stance to the extent that a discussion of the effects of
Lost Creek Dam were necessary to indicate the cumulative impact resulting from the Elk Creek project.127 Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit held that the Corps failed to adequately consider
the cumulative impact of the Elk Creek project in conjunction
with the two already completed dams; and that this inquiry
should take place before proceeding with construction of the last
dam. 128
B.

DISSENT

Judge Wallace dissented from the portion of the majority
opinion requiring the Corps to issue a new supplementary
EIS.129 The dissent applied the Stop H-3 four-factor analysis to
evaluate the reasonableness of the Corps' decision not to supplement the EIS.130
Judge Wallace first analyzed the Oregon Department of
Fish and Wildlife's (Department) conclusions regarding the environmental impact of the project.13l Two independent experts,
selected by the Corps, reviewed the Department's study, as well
as Corps experts. 132 These authorities conceded that while some
Department conclusions were valid, many were unreliable due to
flawed methodology, statistical inaccuracy or "undue biological
speculation."133 Relying on these comments and statements by
the Department's program leader conceding some possible inaccuracies, Judge Wallace argued that the Department's study was
of dubious accuracy and therefore not significant under the first
Stop H-3 factor.l34
Applying the third and fourth Stop H-3 factors, Judge Wallace argued that the Corps exercised a high degree of care in
127. ld. "[T]he Corps [must] consider cumulative impacts of the proposed actions
which supplement or aggravate the impacts of past, present, and reasonably foreseeable
actions." ld. at 1059.
128. ld. at 1060.
129. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir.
1987) (Wallace, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
130. ld. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
131. ld. at 1062-64. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
132. ld. at 1062-63.
133. ld.
134. ld.
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evaluating this information and had sufficiently supported its
decision not to supplement the EIS by communicating a formal
response to the Department. lslI For these reasons Judge Wallace
concluded that the Corps' decision not to supplement the EIS
was reasonable. ISS
Judge Wallace scrutinized the United States Soil Conservation Service's (Service) report suggesting increased turbidity in
the Rogue resulting from construction of the dam.137 The Service found sedimentation levels in the Elk Creek area in excess
of those reported in the EIS.138 Though Judge Wallace considered this information accurate, he concluded it was not sufficiently significant to require supplementation of the EIS.Is9
Since the Corps could reasonably conclude that the Service's concerns were not significant, minimal additional analysis
would satisfy the Corps' obligation under the third Stop H-3
factor. 14o Judge Wallace noted that the Corps never specifically
supported its decision not to supplement the EIS to address the
Service's data, the fourth Stop H-3 factor.141 However, in consideration of all the factors, the Judge concluded that the majority's decision requiring the issuance of a new supplemental EIS
addressing the Service's study was unreasonable. 142 The court's
function is not to determine the scientific validity of the Corps'
assessments of this new information, but to determine whether
the Corps responded reasonably to the concerns raised. 14s
135. [d. at 1064. The dissent considered that the Corps' review of the Department
study by its own and independent specialists satisfied the third Stop H-3 factor regarding the level of care exercised by an agency in response to newly acquired information.
[d. Furthermore, the dissent considered the Corps' formal response directed to one of
the Department's three main concerns as sufficient to satisfy its obligation to support its
decision under the fourth Stop H-3 factor. [d.
136. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1064 (Wallace, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
137. [d.
138. Id.
139. [d. at 1064-65. Judge Wallace pointed to considerable evidence indicating the
lack of a direct relationship between soil type and turbidity. Id. at 1064. See supra note
102 and accompanying text.
140. [d. at 1064-65. Though the Corps undertook no further studies in response to
the Service's report, the dissent argued that the Corps had good reason to conclude that
the Service's conclusions were unfounded. [d.
141. [d.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1065.
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CRITIQUE

In Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, the Ninth
Circuit appropriately concluded that the Corps' Elk Creek Dam
EIS violated the National Environmental Policy Act. 144 With
each issue, the court analyzed the sufficiency of the Corps' presentation mindful of the EIS's purpose: to promote informed decision-making and informed public participation.145 By remanding this case to the district court for appropriate injunctive
relief, the Ninth Circuit took a firm step towards assuring that
the full extent of Elk Creek Dam's environmental impact will be
assessed before construction can resume.146
The Ninth Circuit had little difficulty concluding that the
mitigation measures submitted violated NEPA.147 The EIS's
summary statement of nondescript mitigation measures simply
failed to fulfill the Corps' obligation to provide a coherent and
effective mitigation plan.148
Marsh, in harmony with cases reviewing comparable deficiencies, recognized that the Corps' mitigation plan failed to fulfill its purpose.149 For example, in Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association v. Peterson,150 the Ninth Circuit rejected
a Forest Service mitigation plan which merely listed mitigation
measures without an evaluation of their effectiveness.lI5l Similarly, in Prince George's County, Md. v. Holloway/52 the court
rejected an EIS which failed to address measures to mitigate the
impact of an influx of military personnel into the community.153
In Marsh, because the mitigation measures offered were so
144. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d 1051, 1061-62 (9th Cir.
1987).
145. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1054. See supr:a text accompanying notes 26-27.
146. Id. at 1062.
147. Id. at 1055. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
148. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1055. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
149. Id. A mitigation plan presented without evaluation of its effectiveness does not
promote informed decision-making. Id.
150..764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated in part on rehearing on other grounds,
795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. granted sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. 1971 (1987); see supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
151. Id. at 588.
152. 404 F. Supp. 1181 (D.D.C. 1975), discussed supra note 39.
153. Id. at 1186-87.
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vague and undeveloped, evaluation of their effectiveness was impossible; and therefore, a violation of NEPA's procedural requirements. llS4 By rejecting the Corps' minimal effort, Marsh,
. like Northwest Indian and Prince George's County, reaffirmed
the principle that a complete mitigation plan is a critical factor
in judging the environmental impact of an agency's actions. llSlS
Furthermore, little fault can be found with the court's conclusion that the EIS inadequately treated areas of uncertain environmental impact. llSs Here, the Corps' own data indicated uncertainty regarding Elk Creek's water flow contribution to the
Rogue, a key factor affecting turbidity levels. llS7 The requirement
of a worst case analysis is necessary where, as in the present
case, the extent of damage to the ecosystem is undetermined due
to gaps in relevant data. llS8 In Sierra Club v. Sigler,lIS9 the Fifth
Circuit required analysis of the effects of a hypothetical massive
oil spill in order to fully disclose the possible environmental
costs of a planned oil superport. ISO As in Sigler, if decision-makers and the public are to be fully informed of a project's impact,
the full range of its environmental costs must be addressed. l6l
In addition, the court properly held that the Corps violated
NEPA's cumulative impact requirement. ls2 In Thomas v. Peterson,IS3 the Ninth Circuit struck down the Forest Service's approval of a timber harvesting project and related road construction, where the Service did not evaluate the combined
environmental impact of the projects. lM In Marsh, the EIS
stated that fish production from increased turbidity would not
be adversely affected. ISIS However, this conclusion was reached
by consideration of the turbidity resulting from the Elk Creek
154. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1055.
155. [d.
156. [d. at 1059.
157. [d. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
158. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1059.
159. 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983), discussed supra notes 63-67.
160. [d. at 974-75.
161. See Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1984), discussed supra note 68-72, where the BLM was required to analyze, in the EIS, the possibility that its herbicide spraying program might cause the spread of cancer.
162. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1060.
163. 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985), discussed supra notes 79-84.
164. [d. at 761.
165. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1060.
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project alone, disregarding the impact of the two other dams in
the Rogue Basin Project. 166 An EIS like the one in Marsh or in
Thomas, which overlooks a project's actual environmental effects by considering it apart from existing conditions is incomplete, and serves to mislead rather than inform those who rely
on it.167
While these aspects of the present decision are important,
Marsh's true significance is revealed in the court's analysis of
the Corps' duty to supplement the EIS. In rejecting the Corps'
decision not to supplement the EIS, the Ninth Circuit closely
scrutinized the Corps' conduct under a reasonableness standard. 16s
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the information acquired
by the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife and the United
States Soil Conservation Service was environmentally significant, despite strong disagreement by Corps experts.169 Second,
despite similar opposition, the majority determined that "some"
of this information was probably accurate. 170 Third, even though
Corps experts reviewed much of this information, the court held
that the Corps failed to adequately respond to it.l7l Finally, the
court concluded that the Corps did not offer any explanation or
additional data to support its decision not to supplement its
EIS, despite the Corps' position that this information did not
merit formal response. 172
Faced with this dispute among experts regarding the significance and accuracy of this new information, many courts would
have upheld the Corps' decision as reasonable. 173 For example,
in Township of Springfield v. Lewis,174, the Third Circuit upheld
an agency decision to include new environmental information in
166. [d.
167. [d.
168. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1056-58. The court applied a four-factor analysis citing
Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442, 1464 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1108
(1985).
169. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1057. See supra notes 97-106 & 132-33.
170. [d.
171. [d. at 1057-58.
172. [d.
173. See, e.g., Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1062 (Wallace, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part), supra notes 129-143 and accompanying text.
174. 702 F.2d 426 (3rd Cir. 1983), discussed supra notes 28 & 46.
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its EIS after it had been circulated. l'16 The Third Circuit's validation of an agency's supplementation of significant information
to an EIS after circulation directly contradicts the purpose of
the EIS: to promote informed decision-making. l'16 In Wisconsin
v. Weinberger,l'1'1 the Seventh Circuit extended itself in upholding an agency's decision by treating a Navy decision not to supplement its EIS, as a decision not to issue an EIS.l'1S This technique allowed the court to apply a much less rigorous review
of the Navy's actions, so that reversal would be virtually
impossible.
Marsh's significance lies in the majority's willingness to undertake a probing and in-depth review of the circumstances surrounding the Corps' decisions, rather than to defer to the
agency's expertise. l'19 Disagreement among experts frequently
occurs. Where, as here, legitimate concerns are raised regarding
a project's environmental consequences, the Ninth Circuit properly concluded that this information should have been addressed
in the EIS.lsO This result is further justified by the substantial
environmental damage that the Elk Creek Project would cause:
the irretrievable destruction of prime wilderness areas in the upper Rogue Valley, as well as irretrievable losses to fish and wildlife habitat. lsl

The immediate impact of the Ninth Circuit's decision is to
suspend construction of the project.1S2 Compliance with the
court's decision forces the Corps to evaluate new information
relevant to Elk Creek's environmental impact, and to compare it
with its own conclusions. ls3 This will increase project costs. In
addition to the possibility that this process might reveal errors
175. [d. at 439.
176. Citizens for a Better Henderson v. Hodel, 768 F.2d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 1985),
discussed supra note 26.
177. 745 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1984), see supra note 46.
178. [d. at 417.
179. Despite the United States Supreme Court's advocacy of "substantial inquiry"
of an agency's decisions by a reviewing court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971), many courts are satisfied if the agency demonstrates
that it took a "hard look" at the project's environmental consequences. Kleppe v. Sierra
Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976); discussed supra note 27.
180. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1057.
181. [d. at 1059, see supra note 11.
182. [d. at 1060.
183. [d. at 1061-62.
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or inconsistencies in the Corps' position, project opponents gain
time to gather political strength, information and influence. I84
Furthermore, as time passes and costs increase, assumptions relating to the project's benefits may no longer remain valid.
These factors could conceivably result in cancellation of a controversial project such as Elk Creek Dam.
In cases such as Marsh, abandonment of the project is appropriate since its environmental costs far outweigh the benefits
to be gained by the addition of a third dam in the Rogue watershed. I81S Substantial evidence indicates that the key factor propelling the Elk Creek project was a Congressional intent to
channel federal largesse back to the constituency, rather than to
realize any significant benefit to flood control. I86
Regarding the prospective impact of the present case,
Marsh serves as a signal to government agencies that the Ninth
Circuit will not tolerate half-hearted efforts in the evaluation of
the environmental effects of agency actions. Marsh indicates
that the courts will take a "hard look" at agency decisions to
assure that NEPA's objectives of fostering informed decisionmaking and public access to relevant information are satisfied.
Agency generation of voluminous data will not guarantee acceptance of its decisions if responsible opposing opinions are ignored or required analyses are glossed over. Marsh stands for
the proposition that the courts will accept a significant role,
under NEP A, in ensuring that all the potential environmental
costs of agency actions be disclosed prior to proceeding.
Unfortunately, as indicated by many of the cases surveyed
above, courts frequently defer to agency decisions in challenges
184. See MURCHISON, supra note 21, at 611-13 (the information and time gained as a
result of NEPA procedural requirements may aid in influencing an agency to abandon its
proposal).
185. See Oregon Natural Resources Council, White Paper (August 23, 1987)
(presenting evidence of severe environmental effects of the project, and General Accounting Office (GAO) challenges to claimed benefits of the project). Id. at 5-6. Furthermore, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service questioned whether prior forecasts of water
storage needs supporting the project were still accurate. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1058 n.7; see
supra note 111.
186. Id. at 7-8. The White Paper surveys the political historY of the Elk Creek Project and points out the Corps' prior opposition. Id.
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to the sufficiency of an EIS.187 CEQ guidelines however, as utilized in Marsh, provide important support for the requirement
of full environmental disclosure. Nevertheless, the essential solu-:
tion to the environmental issues presented in Marsh require further legislation at the federal level to prevent the needless destruction of our natural resources. Congress must recognize that
retention of rapidly disappearing wilderness areas and wildlife
habitat require preference in the evaluation of whether to proceed with planned development. However, as long as projects
like Elk Creek provide a popular device to channel federal funds
back to one's constituency, those interested in protecting the environment can not hope for significant Congressional action in
the near future. .
VI. CONCLUSION

Marsh is a victory for those who seek to limit the development and destruction of our natural resources. However, since
this victory may only result in the temporary postponement of
the Elk Creek project, it should not cause euphoria. While
Marsh demonstrates that the courts will support the policies underlying the National Environmental Policy Act, only by further
legislation insuring preference to environmental concerns can
our natural resources be adequately protected from unnecessary
development.
James J. Wesser*

187. See e.g., Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1985), supra notes 29-34 and
accompanying text; Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1108 (1985), supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text; Druid Hills Civic Ass'n
v. Federal Highway Admin., 772 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1985), supra note 28; Township of
Springfield v. Lewis, 702 F.2d 426 (3rd Cir. 1983), supra note 28; Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1984), supra note 46.
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1988.
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